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CUSTOMARY IVORY LAW: INEFFICIENT PROBLEM 
SOLVING WITH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Mike Graves † 
Abstract:  For one of only two principal sources of international law, 
customary international law is surprisingly opaque.  Scholars disagree not only on 
whether a particular norm has become a customary law, but also on what constitutes 
persuasive evidence of that fact.  One popular theory advanced by Anthony D’Amato and 
others—that treaties can provide sufficient evidence of customary international law—
attempts to clarify and simplify the process.  It does so at the expense of accuracy.  This 
error is particularly clear in the context of environmental law.  
Customary international law, such scholars argue, protects a wide variety of 
creatures and natural resources.  As evidence, they cite to treaties on conservation, noting 
their widespread international support.  For the African elephant, this is, at best, a legal 
fiction.  Sobering reports of elephant population declines throughout most of Africa 
indicate an uncertain future for the species. This article argues that these scholarly 
assertions are erroneously made based on a theory of customary law that gives excessive 
weight to treaties as evidence of custom. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the conceptual and evidentiary problems 
inherent in relying on treaties to articulate customary international law.  Primarily, it 
analyzes the habit of tribunals and scholars using treaties this way to artificially assert, 
and thereby create, customary international law to address global social problems.  This 
phenomenon is especially clear in the context of the ivory trade.  Using China as a case 
study, this article concludes that asserting customary international law where there is 
little evidence for it may ultimately hinder solutions to the very problems the advocates 
seek to resolve.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Customary international law cannot save the elephant.  Or rather, 
current popular theories of customary international law make it immaterial 
to the survival of the elephant.  Increasingly, tribunals and scholars argue 
that treaties supplant other forms of evidence used to establish customary 
international law.1  These arguments have produced a theory of custom 
formation that holds that treaties can provide sufficient evidence for both of 
the necessary elements of customary international law.2  That is, a relevant 
                                                 
† Mike Graves is a J.D. Candidate at University of Washington School of Law, expected to graduate 
in June 2017. The author would like to thank Professor Melissa Durkee for her guidance and advice, and 
the staff of the Washington International Law Journal for their work.  
1  See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 31 
(Feb. 20); Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457 
(1991). 
2  Anthony D’Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); see also Daniel 
Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 105, 116 (1995-1996).  
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treaty on a particular legal norm provides both evidence of general practice 
and a nation’s opinio juris.3  By providing evidence of both elements, 
consensus of particular norms appear artificially high based on widely 
signed multilateral treaties.  This allows advocates to assert that a norm has 
risen to the level of customary international norm without regard for 
contrary empirical evidence that may weigh against that assertion.  
 The international legal regime protecting elephants has produced one 
such multilateral treaty.  The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) provides the African 
elephant with the highest level of protection available to endangered 
species.4  CITES also addresses several problems specific to elephant 
conservation by putting in place ivory trade regulations and creating a 
monitoring tool dedicated to elephant poaching.5  As of October, 2016, 
CITES had 183 signatory parties.6  Within the parameters of the treaty, the 
elephant garners massive international protections and ivory can only be 
traded under limited circumstances.  From this perspective, the international 
community appears to have reached a consensus regarding elephant 
conservation. 
 Contrast this perspective with the empirical reality of the ivory trade 
in China.  China is the largest importer of illegally harvested elephant ivory.7  
Demand for carved ivory grows at the pace of China’s middle and upper 
class.8  Yet China has been a signatory and full participant9 in the ivory 
                                                 
3  See infra Part I.b.  
4  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, app. I, Mar. 3, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. 
5  See REPORT ON MONITORING THE ILLEGAL KILLING OF ELEPHANTS, CoP17 Doc. 57.5 (Oct. 5, 
2016) [hereinafter MIKE]; INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION, SPECIES TRADE AND 
CONSERVATION, ELEPHANTS, MONITORING OF ILLEGAL TRADE IN IVORY AND OTHER ELEPHANT 
SPECIMENS, ETIS REPORT OF TRAFFIC, CoP16 Doc. 53.2.2 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3–14, 2013) [hereinafter ETIS 
REPORT]. MIKE tracks the proportion of illegally killed elephants relative to natural deaths. Currently, 
roughly 60% of elephants found dead were killed illegally. 
6  List of Contracting Parties, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 
14, 2017). 
7  See Made in China, EIA GLOBAL (May 27, 2007), http://eia-global.org/news-media/made-in-
china-how-chinas-illegal-ivory-trade-is-causing-a-21st-century-afri; Per Liljas, The Ivory Trade is Out of 
Control, and China Needs to Do More to Stop It, TIME (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://world.time.com/2013/11/01/the-ivory-trade-is-out-of-control-and-china-needs-to-do-more-to-stop-it/; 
Dan Levin, From Elephants’ Mouths, an Illicit Trail to China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/asia/an-illicit-trail-of-african-ivory-to-china.html (China’s 
involvement in the ivory trade is well documented.). 
8  See Elephant Slaughter Escalates as Illegal Ivory Market Thrives, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., 
https://awionline.org/awi-quarterly/2013-winter/elephant-slaughter-escalates-illegal-ivory-market-thrives 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (Raw ivory sells for roughly $80 USD per kilogram, typical elephants carry 10 
kilograms of ivory. However, worked ivory is worth around $1,800 per kilogram in China.); Jeffrey 
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control program of CITES since 1991.10  Given this international 
commitment, China’s position on shutting down the trade of ivory should be 
clear, and yet, the ivory trade in the region continues unabated.  China’s 
position on ivory provides a good example of the tension inherent in relying 
heavily on treaties as proof of customary law. 
 China’s actions telegraph two positions to the international 
community.  First, by signing CITES and rescinding reservations regarding 
the ivory trade, China affirmed the treaty’s position on ivory.  Second, 
China’s open role as the largest end-use market for ivory has persisted for 
decades.11  Indeed, as recently as 2015, “the Chinese market has been more 
heavily implicated in illicit trade in ivory than any other country.”12  This 
seems to indicate a position antithetical to the ivory regulations created 
under CITES.13  Under customary international law (CIL), China’s belief in 
the legality of the ivory market has significant consequences for the legal 
protection arguably afforded the elephant.  Since the available evidence 
indicates two contradictory positions, China’s opinio juris is, at best, 
unclear.  
China’s role in the ivory market make the nation an essential factor 
for determining whether elephants are protected under CIL.  Significantly, 
China’s role in the market, both as a consumer and facilitator for carved 
ivory products, suggests that China does not consider itself bound by 
international law to protect endangered species like the elephant despite its 
ratification of CITES.  In spite of this, scholars have argued—based in part 
on widespread ratification of CITES—that international protection of 
endangered species has become part of CIL.14  This argument, relying 
significantly on CITES to justify the status of endangered species under CIL, 
obscures the actual state of ivory trade.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Gentleman, Closing China’s Ivory Market: Will It Save Elephants?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/world/africa/africa-ivory-china.html.   
9  See CITES, supra note 4, at art. 22. 
10  List of Contracting Parties, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 
14, 2017). 
11  ETIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
12  Id.  
13  See CITES, supra note 4, at app. II n.6 (exempting Loxodonta Africana). 
14  See Gary D. Meyers, Surveying the Lay of the Land, Air, and Water: Features of Current 
International Environmental and Natural Resources Law, and Future Prospects for the Protection of 
Species Habitat to Preserve Global Biological Diversity, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 479 (1992); 
Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). 
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 China’s message to the international community highlights the 
difficulty in international law of attributing intention to nations joining 
multilateral treaties.  Signing a treaty like CITES is a political decision, 
often requiring no immediate legal action, but one which purports to indicate 
some consensus among the signatories.  The continued existence of the ivory 
market shows that such a consensus is, at least in part, misleading.  If the 
widespread ratification of CITES is not indicative of a nation’s position 
regarding endangered species, international tribunals should be skeptical of 
such inferences.  China’s position indicates a conceptual tension between the 
function of multilateral treaties and the use of those treaties as evidence of 
emerging customary international law.  Without adequate regard for both 
aspects of the state’s position, the state of customary international law will 
not reflect reality.    
In section one, this comment provides a basic overview of customary 
law and some of its conceptual difficulties.  I argue that the element of CIL 
distinctly responsible for its ineffectual application is opinio juris.  This 
section also examines the argument that treaties, specifically multilateral 
treaties, provide adequate evidence of a customary norm.  Evidence has two 
main functions within CIL, it supports the existence of a current norm or 
indicates the development of a new norm.  Multilateral treaties involve such 
complex interactions between parties that their use as evidence of CIL would 
seem to supply both of these functions.  In section two, I argue that relying 
on a multilateral treaty to provide evidence of an emerging customary norm 
allows courts, scholars, and policy makers to overlook other relevant 
evidence.  This results in the erroneous assertion of customary international 
law. 
 The argument that the protection of elephants has risen to the level of 
CIL is a poignant example of this error.  Section three looks at the state of 
elephant populations and the different attempts CITES has made over the 
last thirty years to control the ivory trade.  It then examines China’s role in 
the ivory trade throughout that period.  Finally, this comment looks at a 
scholarly article from 1990 which argued that protections of elephants as 
endangered species had at that time risen to the level of customary 
international law.  Elephants have been considered endangered species for 
decades.  The claim that CIL protects the elephant must reconcile itself with 
the success or failure of the international community’s past attempts to 
control the ivory trade.  
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Asserting norms as customary international law without proper 
evidence obscures the actual state of problems facing the international 
community and slow progress that could otherwise have been made.  
International treaties protecting endangered species presents such a distorted 
picture.  The decline in elephant populations stands in stark contrast to the 
claim that the international community wants to protect them.  If the African 
elephant is truly worth protecting, we ought to be honest about the current 
international legal regime protecting the species. 
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EVIDENCE THAT IT EXISTS 
CIL is typically defined as “international custom, as evidence of 
general practice accepted as law.”15  Generally, custom is created and 
sustained by the “constant and uniform practice of States […] in 
circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct 
in the future.”16  The definition is typically broken down into two parts: 1) 
the objective, “constant and uniform practice of States”; and 2) the 
subjective, known as opinio juris seu necessitatis, that these actions are 
taken from a sense of legal obligation.17  
Looking first at the objective element, state practice is a public 
action18 undertaken by a national entity.19  To be considered CIL, practice 
must be “constant and uniform” across states, such that variations from a 
particular state or group of states weighs against its status as customary 
international law.20  “Although the passage of only a short period of time is 
not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law,” the International Court of Justice held in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case, “State practice, that of States whose interests are 
specially affect, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in 
                                                 
15  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179. 
16 See infra note 75, at 720.  
17  Francois Geny “offered two elements of custom: usage (repeated practices) and opinio juris seu 
necessitatis, the latter meaning that the usage must amount to the “exercise of a (subjective) right of those 
who practice it.” David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International 
Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 44 (2010) (“[T]he combined objective and subjective inquiries for 
CIL formation (state practice and opinio juris) remain the crucial algorithm for establishing whether a norm 
really rises to the level of international custom.”).  
18  See Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, International Law Association, Part II(A)(3-6) (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT]. 
19  Id. at Part II(A)(5). 
20  Id. at Part II(C)(13). 
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the sense of the provision invoked.”21  CIL only forms when a sufficient 
number of distinctly affected states participate in a practice.22  When a state 
asserts that a practice is part of CIL, the objective element requires proof 
that there is actual widespread engagement in that practice.23 
For a practice to rise to the level of customary international law, states 
must not only uniformly act a certain way, they must also act from the belief 
that they are complying with a legal obligation.24  This sense of legal 
obligation, opinio juris, allows international actors to distinguish between 
customary international law and acts taken by states out of a sense of 
comity, political expedience, or other norms.25  “The need for such a belief, 
i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the 
opinio juris sive necessitatis.  The States concerned must therefore feel that 
they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.  The frequency, 
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.”26  Without a 
legal justification for taking an action, a practice cannot become a customary 
international law.27  
At its most fundamental level, CIL as a legal system requires clear 
rules for determining the significance of state actions.  However, while the 
rules governing CIL are simple to define, the unwritten nature of CIL makes 
it inherently open to changing circumstances.  Unlike national laws or treaty 
obligations, the formation of customary international law is “by its very 
nature the result of an informal process of rule-creation.” 28  Norms are 
typically generated by a process of express or implied claim and response.29  
                                                 
21  See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 
(Feb. 20).  In The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Denmark and the Netherlands disputed the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s argument that boundaries along the continental shelf were determined by CIL. 
22  Infra note 75, at 720.  
23  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 20 (“We must look at what governments do. The objective facts of their 
behavior speak louder than any deductive theory.”). 
24  Professor James R. Crawford AC, SC, The Identification and Development of Customary 
International Law, Spring Conference of the ILA British Branch – Foundations and Futures of International 
Law, at 6 (May 23, 2014).  
25  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 75. 
26  See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77 
(Feb. 20). 
27  Id. ¶ 77 (“[T]he acts must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”). 
28  Crawford, supra note 24, at 4 (citing Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 
272 Hague Academy of International Law, Collected Courses (1998), 155–410, esp. at 172–76). 
29  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 10 (attributed to example by Myres S. McDougal: if State A 
expressly claims the right to exclude foreign warships from passing through its territorial sea, and State B 
sends a warship through without seeking the permission of A, this is an implicit claim on the part of B that 
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Thus, courts articulate CIL in the context of a dispute between states over 
either the emergence of a new rule governing a novel situation or changing 
the current state of a law.30  Rather than tracking the state of CIL, the 
function of this area of law, as well as the scope of scholarship exploring it, 
focus on the mechanisms of changes in the law and evidence of these 
changes.31 
A. The Problem of Opinio Juris 
Despite the significance of opinio juris, “most commentators 
acknowledge that opinio juris is a concept for which it is difficult to account 
with any consistency.”32  One such problem is the inherent circularity of the 
definition.33  “It is said that CIL is only law if the opinio juris requirement is 
met.  That is, it is only law if states believe it is law.”34  To form a new 
customary law, a state would need to feel legally obligated to act according 
to a law that doesn’t exist yet.  The quixotic struggle of articulating opinio 
juris further complicates what can be used as evidence of a nation’s 
subjective belief in its legal obligation.35  Verbal acts36 usually signify this 
belief.37  However, courts may give physical acts more weight in 
determining CIL.38  Inside the realm of personified state-action, it is difficult 
to imagine any other kind of evidence outside of verbal or physical acts.  
This ambiguity has led to various accounts of opinio juris that try to capture 
both its purpose and current usage.39  Primarily, these accounts try to make 
sense of a state’s purported belief when it says one thing and does another. 
                                                                                                                                                 
A has no right to prohibit the passage. If A fails to protest against this infringement, this omission can, in its 
turn, constitute a tacit admission of the existence of a right of passage after all.). 
30  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 74. 
31 Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 
129 (1971). 
32  Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 178 (2001); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of 
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2000). 
33  Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 124 (2006). 
34  Id. (citing D’Amato, supra note 2, at 66).  
35  Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary Is Customary International Law?, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 885, 910 (2013).  
36  Such as diplomatic statements, policy statements, press releases, official manuals, etc. See ILA 
REPORT, supra note 18, Part II(A)(4). 
37  Id. Part II(A)(4) commentary at 14.  
38  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, Part II(A)(3) commentary at 13; see also D’Amato, supra note 2, at 
20 (“The objective facts of their behavior speak louder than any deductive theory.”).  
39  See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 33, at 146–48 (providing a rational choice analysis of opinio juris); 
Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RE-CUEIL DES COURS 155, 
250 (1998).  
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 The North Sea Continental Shelf Case had two impacts on these 
accounts. It first acknowledged that a “norm-creating provision” of a treaty 
could create a rule that becomes “accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as 
to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, 
become parties to”40 that treaty.41  Treaty provisions articulating the parties’ 
belief about a particular CIL “crystalize”42 the norm, expressly codifying it 
into the language of the treaty.  Second, it emphasized the need for 
extensive, rather than lengthy, state practice.43  The dispositive factor is the 
number of states acting in that manner, not the duration of that practice.  
Together, fundamentally norm-creating provisions adopted by a large 
number of the international community can “crystalize” customary 
international law.44  The idea of a “fundamentally norm-creating character” 
of a treaty provision, however novel, indicates the perceived connection 
between treaty-making and future third-party international norms.45  
Treaties, as a result, have an increasingly “strict relationship” with CIL.46  
While this sheds little light on opinio juris as a concept,47 it has led to the 
popular theory that treaties are sufficient to form customary international 
law.48  
 
 
 
                                                 
40  North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 71 (Feb. 
20). 
41  Id. ¶ 70–72. 
42  Id. 
43  See Crawford, supra note 24.  
44  Id. at 4. 
45  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, Part IV(D) (describing the phrase “fundamentally norm-creating 
character” as without antecedents in international law and “somewhat Delphic about what it had in mind”). 
The International Law Association describes its goal as “the study, clarification and development of 
international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect 
for international law."  About Us, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/about_us/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
46  Crawford, supra note 24, at 3 (citing Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2). 
47  For example, a treaty claiming that it considers provision X as crystalizing customary international 
law assumes that the signatory states already felt a legal obligation to do X. Why these nations have this 
subjective belief is the question left unanswered.  
48  See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 2; Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction 
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 53 (1981); R. R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International 
Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 275, 278 (1966). 
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B. Treaties Forming Custom 
This section examines the argument advanced in Anthony D’Amato’s 
The Concept of Custom in International Law, and by other commentators,49 
that treaties can generate customary law.  The basic theory outlined by 
D’Amato is simple.50  CIL requires two elements: a quantitative element, 
namely practice, and a qualitative element, which D’Amato calls an 
articulation.51  Treaties, under this theory, provide evidence of both. 
Treaties provide adequate evidence of practice because they supply 
the necessary commitment to act and generally imply subsequent 
implementation.52  At the moment of ratification, a signatory indicates that 
the state will act in a particular way.  The state has agreed that the treaty 
expresses what it should do, and that variation from the treaty is 
presumptively illegal.  “Whether or not they subsequently act in conformity 
with the treaty, the fact remains that they have so committed to act.”53  State 
practice can be wholly evinced by this commitment. 
The qualitative element, articulation, requires only that a treaty 
specify exactly what signatories commit to do.  Unlike the traditional 
account of CIL, D’Amato rejects state belief as opinio juris as an 
“anthropomorphic fallacy.”54  Rather, the qualitative element requires that 
“an objective claim of international legality be articulated in advance of, or 
concurrently with, the act which will constitute the quantitative elements of 
custom.”55  If the goal is to articulate a norm, then treaties certainly provide 
enough qualitative guidance.  Most substantive provisions in “multilateral 
conventions contain formulations of norms of international law that meet all 
                                                 
49  Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary 
International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71 (1997); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International 
Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 397–400 (1985). 
50  To provide some context to its frequent citation, The Concept of Customary International Law was 
one of the first accounts to argue comprehensively that treaties can play such a large roll in custom 
formation.  His account is consistently cited by commentators making a similar arguments and, to this key 
thesis, are relatively similar.  
51  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 160. 
52  Id. 
53  Anthony D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 459, 462 (1988). 
54  Id. at 464 (“Thus, there is no reason to call for any such subjective and wholly indeterminate test 
of belief when one is attempting to describe how international law works and how its content can be 
proved.”). 
55  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 74.  
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the requirements of articulation.”56  By setting out in writing a legal norm, 
the signatory necessarily acknowledges that norm as part of international 
law. 
These two elements are “used as data to validate alleged norms of 
international law in claim-conflict situations.”57  While he does not exclude 
the possibility of bilateral treaties creating custom,58 D’Amato and other 
commentators focus primarily on multilateral conventions.59  For R.R. 
Baxter, multilateral conventions benefit from clarity:  
Since the treaty speaks with one voice rather than fifty, it is 
much clearer and more direct evidence of the state of the law 
than the conflicting, ambiguous and multi-temporal evidence 
that might be amassed through an examination of the practice of 
each of the individual States.60  
A multilateral treaty best articulates customary international law because it 
unifies a wide number of states under a single understanding of expected 
legal norms.  As a source of data used by courts, multilateral treaties 
provides more information in a single source than any other kind of 
evidence.61  
This account benefits primarily from the fact that international 
tribunals actually seem to rely heavily on treaties for evidence of custom.62  
While “there is no a priori hierarchy between treaty and custom as sources 
of international law…in the application of international law, relevant norms 
deriving from treaty will prevail.”63  However, this account goes further than 
                                                 
56  Id. at 162. Although this may not be the case with bilateral treaties. See North Sea Continental 
Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 71–72 (Feb. 20.). 
57  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 162. 
58  Id. at 164. 
59  Scott & Carr, supra note 49, at 72; Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic 
Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT’ L. 9, 19 (1989). 
60  Baxter, supra note 48, at 278. 
61  D’Amato, supra note 2, at 164 (“A multilateral convention among ten states is the equivalent of 
forty-five similarly worded bilateral treaties among the same ten states.”). 
62  See Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, at 
256–58 (July 8); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and 
Ger/Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 31 (Feb. 20); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 
I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 4 (Apr. 6). 
63  Sands, supra note 73, at 96 (citing Conclusion 10 of Problems arising from a Succession of 
Codification Conventions on a Particular Subject, reprinted in 66 Annuaire I.D.I. 435, 441 (1996-II)). 
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reliance, arguing that a treaty by itself establishes custom.64  “[A] treaty is 
itself a legal commitment. For that reason alone, it has an impact upon 
customary law.”65  
This represents a major shift from the International Law Association’s 
(“ILA”) view of custom outlined above, but it has intuitive appeal.  For 
instance, the theory allows for the assertion that torture by a state violates 
customary international law,66 that states have an international obligation to 
prevent injury to the environment of another,67 that whales have a right to 
life,68 and, relevantly, that endangered species are protected.69  For human 
rights and environmental advocates, these assertions represent the ideal state 
of international law.  However, it seems equally intuitive that evidence of 
widespread contrary practice can be found.70  The apparent disparity 
between reality and asserted customary international law in these cases 
points towards a flaw in the argument.  
II. CUSTOM CANNOT PLAY TWO ROLES WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
When a treaty fails to solve a problem, asserting that CIL can resolve 
what the treaty could not is the next logical legal argument.71  Where the 
object and purpose of a treaty is particularly directed towards addressing 
such a problem,72 advocates have limited legal recourse.  Advocates in this 
situation have only two real legal options: 1) seek to draft another treaty, or 
2) assert that CIL now addresses the issue directly.  CIL has the additional 
benefit of extending legal norms beyond treaty signatories to third party 
                                                 
64  For a well cited example, see Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295. 
65  D’Amato, supra note 53, at 464. 
66  Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 
1128–29 (1982); see also infra Part V. 
67  PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84–85 
(1992). 
68  Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 
21 (1991). 
69  Glennon, supra note 14, at 30; see cf. Carr & Scott, supra note 49, at 313. 
70  Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: 
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 769 (2001) (stating modern custom is “descriptively inaccurate 
because it reflects ideal, rather than actual, standards of conduct.”). 
71    See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 88–90 (1992). 
72  “Recognizing, in addition, that international co-operation is essential for the protection of certain 
species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade.” CITES, supra note 4, 
at preamble ¶ 4. 
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states.73  Advocates frequently “make claims about [customary international 
law] that are difficult to square with the observed behavior of states.”74  The 
crux of this problem comes from the peculiar ontological status CIL has 
within international law.  CIL reflects both current norms and developing 
norms.  Indeed, “[d]espite the fact that customary law is one of the two 
principal sources of international law (the other being treaty law), there are 
inherent serious difficulties in setting out the rules on this subject.”75  
Relying on treaties as a sole source of evidence for CIL allows the 
aspirational nature of norm-creating treaties, especially prevalent in human 
rights and environmental treaties, to appear successful artificially.  The 
problem with this account is a) that it conflates evidence of custom as 
custom itself, at the cost of clarity in the law; and b) as a result, the theory 
removes the onus for addressing global problems through alternative, more 
effective means while at the same time making it easier to assert newly 
formed custom.  It asks little of the international community to acknowledge 
the binding effect of already ratified multilateral treaties, even if those 
treaties are not followed. 
A. The Dual Legal Function of Treaties is One Too Many 
The defect in D’Amato’s account is best seen in contrast with the 
current ILA definition of multilateral treaties as evidence of customary 
international law.  The ILA makes a purposeful distinction between actions 
taken under a treaty obligation and those that arise from opinio juris.76  
Multilateral treaties most constitute evidence of CIL when they either 
explicitly crystalize the understanding of the parties regarding CIL, or when 
the treaty has been used to structure agreements between parties and non-
parties.77 
There is no presumption that multilateral treaties provide evidence of 
a customary rule; if a nation acts only out of obligation to conform with a 
                                                 
73  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, May 5, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; ILA 
REPORT, supra note 18, Part I(1)(iii); see also Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization 
of International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 93 (1998). 
74  Guzman, supra note 33, at 118 (citing Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980)) 
(arguing that torture is a violation of customary human rights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. g. & rep. n.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
75  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. 
76  Id. at 46.  
77  Id.; see, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 64, art. X (codifying 
sovereignty over a nation’s territory). 
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treaty, the nation is not conforming to a new CIL.78  Multilateral treaties 
provide evidence of new customary rules through state practice only insofar 
as the treaty promotes state practice outside of strict treaty obligation.79  
Actions towards non-party members provides evidence of CIL precisely 
because the treaty imposes no obligations between those states.80  According 
to this account, treaties rarely codify custom unless the treaty makes that fact 
explicit, because “it would not be worth the parties’ effort to do so.”81  
Multilateral treaties are an increasingly important82 source of evidence 
for CIL, but to say they therefore fully express CIL expands the scope of 
state obligations; a logical step incompatible with the ILA account. Strictly 
speaking, under the ILA view, if every state were to sign a treaty to do X 
practice, and then continuously did X, it could not become a customary 
international norm.  There would be no legal obligation imposed external to 
the treaty.83  
The argument that treaties form custom collapses the distinction 
between these two obligations.  A treaty must provide both evidence of 
practice and opinio juris.  “Articulation” expresses an aggregated assertion 
of integrational law, both of customary law and the treaty.  Equating the two 
sources of international law provides a conceptually tidy account of CIL and 
reduces the number of sources needed by tribunals and commentators to 
show custom.84  Custom formation is logically distinct from evidence 
proving that custom.  Evidence of something does not necessarily constitute 
the thing itself.85  And yet, if treaties occupy a dual role in custom 
generation, treaty as evidence of custom must also form custom.  
D’Amato’s explanation of the customary prohibition against torture in 
the face of significant evidence of contrary government practice highlights 
                                                 
78  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 46. 
79  Id.; see, e.g., Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War 
Criminals, UK Command Paper Cmd. 6964, at 65 (1946). 
80  ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 47. 
81  Id. at 26. 
82  Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law Modifies Treaties, 
41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237, 244 (2016) (citing Charlotte Ku, Global Governance and the Changing Face of 
International Law, in 2 ACAD. COUNCIL U.N. SYS. REP. & PAPERS 1, 5 (2001)) (“According to one study, 
eighty-six multilateral treaties were concluded in the century between 1648 through 1748-but more than 
two thousand such treaties were concluded in the twenty-five years between 1951 and 1975!”). 
83  See ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 46. 
84  See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 
20); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
85  See Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 26-33 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., abr. ed. 
1934). 
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the error of confusing evidence of custom with custom.86  The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment87 purports to do just that, ban torture; 
arguendo, its ratification provides evidence for, and represents the formation 
of, a customary international law against torture.  Yet states continue to 
torture.  Rather than conclude that the issue is unresolved, D’Amato 
undervalues the value of this evidence that would undermine his account by 
giving an odd example to clarify his position. 
 Namely, the fact that governments do not admit to torture indicates 
the prohibition’s status under CIL: states appoint commissions to investigate 
instances of torture, and they do not claim to torture legally.88  He contrasts 
this with the state of torture during the medieval Spanish Inquisition, where 
states would certainly admit that torture was legal.89  Essentially, the 
prohibition against torture survives contrary evidence because the treaty 
remains in effect and governments act as if they recognize the criminality of 
torture they are themselves committing.  The Convention proves that there is 
a customary prohibition against torture and provides evidence of that custom 
to rebut contrary evidence.  Except for the treaty, as a dual source of 
international law, the acts of states would not support this conclusion.90 
III. THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY NORMS WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE 
 
At the very least, the fact that a state in the example above can 
consistently violate a norm-creating provision of a treaty with impunity 
while at the same time providing evidence of that norm as customary law 
contradicts basic expectations of a legal rule.91  Responding to similar 
criticism, D’Amato seems to see this as one of the benefits of his approach.92  
It allows scholars to assert that certain desirable norms, like the prohibition 
against torture, are legal obligations states must follow, regardless of their 
actual compliance.93  What would be the alternative? What benefit could be 
                                                 
86  D’Amato, supra note 53, at 464 (citing D’Amato, supra note 66, at 126).  
87  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
88  D’Amato, supra note 53, at 467. 
89  Id. 
90  See Mark A. Weisburd, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case of India, 2 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 81 (2001). 
91  See Arthur Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D’Amato, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 473, 477 
(1988). 
92  D’Amato, supra note 53, at 472. 
93  Id. 
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derived from undermining the claim that torture is internationally illegal?94  
For D’Amato, a world where nations must hide the fact that they 
torture is preferable to one where they do not.  Arthur Weisburd provides a 
clear counterpoint to this argument, specifically regarding torture.95  Rather 
than posit the existence of a customary norm against torture, Weisburd 
concludes that: 
[A] large number of states are not ready to give up the authority 
to treat their citizens in a beasty fashion.  Proclaiming that such 
action is illegal amounts to proclaiming that international law is 
ineffective, since the beastlieness [sic] continues despite the 
denunciation.96  
Unsurprisingly, the contrast between these two views is clearest when a 
widely ratified, norm-creating, multilateral treaty has been empirically 
unsuccessful at resolving the problem it set out to solve.97  
IV. ELEPHANT PROTECTION UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This next section compares the state of African elephant populations 
with the international protections afforded protected species under CITES.  
Specifically, it looks at China’s involvement both as a signatory of CITES 
and as a state uniquely involved in the ivory trade.98  This account seeks to 
show the disparity between the aspirations of the international community 
and the empirical reality of the elephant’s legal status as a protected species.  
A. International State of the Ivory Trade Under CITES 
Since 2010, illegal killing has been responsible for over 60% of 
elephant deaths.99  2016 saw “the largest ever continent-wide wildlife 
survey, the Great Elephant Census,” which found that 352,271 savanna 
elephants are left in the species range.100  Largely the result of poaching, the 
                                                 
94  Anthony D’Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 490 (1988). 
95  Weisburd, supra note 91, at 477. 
96  Id. at 487. 
97  Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002). 
98  CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, Co.P16 Doc. 53.2.2 
(Mar. 3, 2013) (considering China a “single country cluster with unique attributes as the premier end-use 
market.”).  
99  See MIKE, supra note 5. 
100  Paul Steyn, African Elephant Numbers Plummet 30 Percent, Landmark Survey Finds, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 31, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-african-elephants-
population-decrease-great-elephant-census/. 
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elephant population has declined at a yearly rate of 8% since 2010.101  While 
shocking, these losses to illegal poaching are hardly new. 102  Elephant 
poaching rates, which continue to exceed natural elephant population growth 
rates, remained virtually unchanged over the last six years.103  Poaching 
continues despite the fact African Elephant (Loxodonta Africana) occupies 
the highest level of protection afforded by the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.104  
The parties of CITES have not been idle in combating the illegal 
poaching of elephants. Under CITES, species are listed in three appendixes, 
the first is reserved for “all species threatened with extinction which are or 
may be affected by trade.”105  It allows export of a specimen with a permit 
when “a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such 
export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species.”106  Concerned 
that the ivory trade would continue unabated, in 1985 the parties created a 
quota and identifying system for managing the export of ivory.107  Under the 
system, the Secretariat tallies the number of tusks exported to ensure the 
quota is followed, and sanctions the permit and import of ivory before a 
country can accept a shipment.108  The parties saw this as a compromise for 
developing nations who wanted to use their natural resources and nations 
seeking to end illegal ivory harvesting.109 
This compromise was unsuccessful and throughout the 1980s the 
ivory trade boomed.110  Game wardens were consistently undermined by 
better-financed poachers.111  A typical game warden is one of between 15 to 
90 guards employed to guard anywhere from 1 to 3 million acres of land.112  
                                                 
101  Id. 
102  See Konrad von Moltke, Brand Name Ivory: An Alternative Way to Think About the Ivory Trade, 2 
J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 79 (1999). 
103  Press Release, CITES, Elephant Poaching rates Virtually unchanged in 2014 (Mar. 23, 2015), 
https://cites.org/eng/mike_figures2014). 
104  CITES, app. I, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; but cf. CITES, app. II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 
(exemptions for “Populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.”). 
105  CITES, art. II(1), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.  
106  Glennon, supra note 14, at 11 (citing CITES, art. III (2)(a), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087). 
107  Id. at 12. 
108  Id. 
109  Thaddeus McBride, The Dangers of Liberal Neo-Colonialism: Elephants, Ivory and the CITES 
Treaty, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 733, 736 (1999). 
110  Glennon, supra note 14, at 20. 
111  See id. at 21 (The funding needed to stop poaching in Kenya’s Tsavo National park alone would 
have been roughly $1.6 million a day). 
112  John A. Hart & Kes H. Smith, TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 3: MONITORING OF ELEPHANT POACHING, 
ANTI-
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Of this area, wardens patrol on average 25% of that total area.113  Poachers, 
on the other hand, are financed by complex criminal syndicates, have the 
benefit of poor, corrupt government officials, and a steady supply of illegal 
weaponry.114  Without addressing the porous borders of wildlife reserves or 
the import of illegal arms, the trade restrictions were ill-equipped to dis-
incentivize organized crime from hiring locals to harvest ivory.  
Ultimately the system had an insignificant effect on ivory production: 
it was voluntary and “other CITES parties had no legal basis under CITES 
for refusing entry to producer state’s ivory.”115  In response to the ineffective 
quota system, the parties voted to enact a total ban on ivory trade in 1989, at 
the objection of several Southern African nations.116  The ban lasted eight 
years ending at the 1997 Conference of the Parties (Co10) during which time 
elephant populations had increased over Southern Africa.117  After the total 
ban was rescinded, the opposite trend was predictable; twenty years later, 
evidence indicates that the illegal trade in ivory has progressively escalated 
since the ban.118  Wildlife is now one of the “top global sources of illegal 
wealth.”119 
B. China’s Opinio Juris Regarding Elephants as a Protected 
Species 
This escalation is even more apparent when narrowed to China’s role 
in the ivory trade.120  Throughout these regulatory shifts, both state and 
private Chinese action continued to promote the flow of ivory from Africa 
into Asia.121  For instance, the 1989 ivory ban excluded ivory harvested 
                                                                                                                                                 
POACHING EFFORT, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA, https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/pi
lot/tech_rep3.shtml (Oct. 2001) (citing Table 1, part 1). 
113  Id. (citing Table 2, part 2). 
114  Adam Vaughan, Kenya's New Front in Poaching Battle: The Future is in the Hands of our 
Communities, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/30/kenya-poaching-elephant-ivory-rhino-horn-
future-communities (three poachers took out 27 elephants in fifteen minutes). 
115  Glennon, supra note 14, at 21. 
116  Namely Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. See List of Contracting Parties, CITES, 
https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2017). 
117  See McBride, supra note 109, at 745 (1999). 
118  CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, Co.P16 Doc. 53.2.2 
(Mar. 3, 2013). 
119  Sam Weru, WILDLIFE PROTECTION AND TRACKING ASSESSMENT IN KENYA 16 (2006) (Table 7). 
120  China was labeled a party of “primary concern” in the national ivory action plan proposed for the 
65th meeting of the Standing Committee (Geneva, July 2014). 
121  See Made in China: How China‘s Illegal Ivory Trade Is Causing a 21st Century African Elephant 
Disaster, ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY (May 16, 2007), www.eia-
international.org/cgi/news/news.cgi?t=template&a=398; See also Gary D. Meyers & Kyla Seligsohn 
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before 1989, called “pre-convention” ivory.122  During the 1990s, China 
allowed that exclusion to be applied retroactively for traders who “forgot” to 
register ivory as pre-convention ivory.123  Half of all ivory seized in 1999 
was destined for China.124  Elephant Trade Information System Report 
(ETIS) singles out China as the country with the most heavily implicated 
market in the illicit ivory trade in terms of frequency and scale of seizures.125  
The report notes:   
The number of ivory seizures that China has made over the 
three-year period 2009 to 2011 is nearly nine times greater than 
the three-year period 2006 to 2008[.] […] [T]he number of 
seizures made by other countries which implicate China in the 
trade has also increased by nearly five-fold over the same 
period of time..126   
While the report also indicates that China has taken a comprehensive 
approach to law enforcement, it found no noticeable deterrent effect from 
China’s increased policing.127 
In September 24, 2015, President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement 
committing both countries to “nearly complete bans on ivory imports and 
exports…and to take significant and timely steps to halt the domestic 
commercial trade of ivory.”128  Months later, in China the price of ivory 
halved.129  However, reports of non-compliance with ivory trade regulations 
continued throughout this period.130  Troublingly, one report indicated that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bennett, Answering 'The Call of the Wild': An Examination of US Participation in International Wildlife 
Law, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 114 (1989). 
122  CITES, art. VII (2), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087. 
123  ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 121. 
124  Id.; see also Christopher Walker & Sarah Cook, The Dark Side of China Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/opinion/25iht-edwalker.html; Catherine Elkemann & 
Oliver C. Ruppel, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment into Africa in the Context of BRICS and Sino-African 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 593, 616-17 (2015). 
125  CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, Co.P16 Doc. 53.2.2 
(Mar. 3, 2013). 
126  Id. 
127  Id.  
128  Press Release, FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the United States, The White 
House (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-
jinpings-state-visit-united-states. 
129   See Ivory Price Drop in China Signals Fall In Demand, Report Says, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/ivory-price-drop-in-china-signals-fall-in-
demand-report-says ($1,100 USD per kg from a record high of $2,100 USD the year before). 
130  Blending Ivory; China’s Old Loopholes, New Hopes, THE ELEPHANT ACTION LEAGUE (Dec. 30, 
2015), http://elephantleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/EAL-BLENDING-IVORY-Report-
Dec2015.pdf. 
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officials and traders continue to subvert the purpose of ivory regulations by 
misapplying the narrow “pre-convention” exception to the ivory ban.131  
In its entirety, China’s response to the provisions of the CITES treaty 
has been divided.  On the one hand officials and law enforcement have taken 
steps to limit the ivory trade, and made statements that these steps were 
taken out of a sense of legal obligation.  However, the continued success of 
the illegal ivory market, and the state’s overall resistance to ivory regulation 
complicates China’s position.  Importantly, China’s opinion juris regarding 
the protections afforded elephants in international law is not simple or 
consistent. 
  Under D’Amato’s theory articulated in section 1(b), China’s position 
would be clear and look entirely different.  As a signatory of CITES, China 
would have committed to protecting endangered species like the elephant 
and upholding the restrictions on ivory trade.  Indeed, relying solely on this 
fact would have entirely contradictory ramifications for CIL.  It should be 
unsurprising then that advocates for the protection of endangered species 
adopt D’Amato’s theory of CIL.  
C. An Environmentalist Response to Persistent Ivory Poaching 
The death of the last elephant would represent an abject failure of the 
entire conservationist movement.  Within the field of conservationist 
biology, elephants are considered a “charismatic megafauna”: large, popular 
species that act as flagships for conservation campaigns.132  If the 
international community cannot protect the elephant, an internationally 
loved yet commercially desirable species, other, less attractive animals will 
not fare better.  The fate of the elephant as a species should be a good over-
all indicator of the international community’s ability to protect endangered 
species. 
The connection between the elephant’s survival as an endangered 
species and the need for successful international action can be seen in 
Michael Glennon’s, “Has International Law Failed the Elephant?”133  
Despite CITES’ inconsistent ability to protect the elephant, as an endangered 
species, Glennon argued that this protection has risen to the level of 
                                                 
131  Id. 
132  Examples include pandas, whales, polar bears, and gorillas. See Emma Marris, Charismatic 
Mammals Can Help Guide Conservation, NATURE (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://www.nature.com/news/charismatic-mammals-can-help-guide-conservation-1.14396. 
133  See Glennon, supra note 14. 
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customary international law, based substantially on the widespread 
ratification of the treaty.134  Paralleling D’Amato, he argues that treaties 
create CIL “‘when such agreements are intended for adherence by states 
generally and are in fact widely accepted.’”135  CITES is his primary 
example.136  Glennon then references several factors that support CITES as 
appropriate evidence of his claim.  The treaty is norm-creating, some non-
parties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements, and it has not 
been rejected by a significant number of non-party states.137  As additional 
evidence for the position that states are obligated to protect endangered 
species, Glennon names the World Charter for Nature138 where the General 
Assembly proclaimed “that the population levels of all life forms, wild and 
domesticated, must be at least sufficient for their survival.”139  
Glennon’s assertion of CIL matches his normative goal: nations ought 
to use more legal and economic resources to stop the decline of elephant 
populations.  For western states, that requires funding nations with elephant 
populations to support conservation.140  However, his argument that 
elephants have this kind of legal protection internationally stands in stark 
contrast to the empirical reality discussed above.  This is as clear now as it 
was in 1990. CIL does not protect  elephants.  
D. Customary International Norms Should Not Reflect Normative 
Aspirations 
Glennon’s argument stems from a problematic account of customary 
international law that too easily grants the existence of norms based on 
treaties like CITES.  Nor is Glennon alone in attempting to solve an 
environmental problem by resorting to CIL.141  For these advocates, 
declaring protective environmental norms as CIL will extend actual 
protection to the environment rather than reflecting the state of international 
law.  As Glennon’s article has aged, this has not been the effect. 
                                                 
134  Id.  
135  Glennon, supra note 14, at 30 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
136  Id. at 31 (Glennon cites other treaties but singles out CITES). 
137  Id. 
138  G.A. Res. 37/7, World Charter for Nature (Oct. 28, 1982). 
139  Id. at I(2). 
140  See Glennon, supra note 14, at 35.  
141  BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 67, at 84–85; Schachter, supra note 1, at 470; see also Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Overview of the Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INT’L L. 
AND POLLUTION 61 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 601-04 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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Rejecting Glennon’s claim that elephants are protected by CIL does 
not require ignoring his normative argument, that elephant populations ought 
to be preserved.142  However, it begs the same question asked by D’Amato 
discussed above, why argue against protecting elephants?  A world where 
CITES has created this international norm is better than one where it has not.  
This gets at the foundation of why custom exists: Is it aspirational or 
pragmatic?  If it is the former, then D’Amato and Glennon are simply 
arguing that nations are aware that they should not torture people, or kill 
elephants for ivory, when a norm becomes part of CIL.  
I argue that the international community is better off taking the 
pragmatic approach; CIL should reflect what nations do, not what we would 
like them to do.  Just as arguing that CIL protects elephants does not actually 
protect the species, stating that there is no CIL protecting elephants will not 
suddenly begin a poaching spree.143  A pragmatic approach to CIL benefits 
from acknowledging that the problem has not been served by the current 
legal scheme.  Legal decision makers are the real target audience for 
writings on customary international law.144  Societal problems are better 
addressed by “building consensus” in support of the authors position or “by 
coercing” bad actors to stop, neither of which are legal determinations.145  
Treaties-as-custom provides a simple solution for a complex problem.  
Blurring the role played by treaties in international law and custom 
formation does not resolve the problem of opinio juris, it ignores it.146  For 
example, Weisburd argues that the stronger indication of CIL is the extent to 
which breach of that norm would result in legal consequences.147  Among 
these consequences are the right to inquire into the facts of the alleged 
breach and, if established, the legal duty to repair the breach.148  Here, opinio 
juris, that nations must not only feel legally obligated to act a certain way 
but also obligated to facilitate sanctions against breach of that norm, better 
                                                 
142  See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 116. 
143  Weisburd, supra note 91, at 478 (“Better formulation of position is not ‘there is an existing rule 
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clarifies the conceptual issues of what exactly opinio juris is.  Tying opinio 
juris to a legal consequence corresponds to the intuitive belief that violating 
a legal norm should have a consequence.  It also explains how custom is 
established.  Since consequences actually flow from a norm rising to the 
level of customary international law, evidence of those consequences 
provide the evidence of nation’s subjective intent.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Authors frequently point to the role of consent in a positivist 
international legal world as the foundation for enforcement.149  This is 
especially true where, absent a written treaty, norms are imposed on states 
who seem to have never addressed the issue.150  Internationally the rules of 
law are binding on states “from their own free will.”151  One key facet of this 
positivist view is the idea that nations—absent some legislative body—do 
not, and will not, consider legally binding laws with which they do not 
agree.152   
Consent as a concept “raises an obvious barrier to the idea that 
multilateral treaties create customary international law and thereby obligate 
non-signatories to abide by their terms.”153  This obvious barrier is simply 
that nations who agree on some particular norm cannot then impose that 
norm on another unilaterally or instantaneously.  As seen in the case of 
China and the ivory trade, this is not an abstract barrier to international 
enforcement of legal norms but an observed reality.  Using simplified 
methods for determining custom does not overcome this fact. 
This article attempts to take serious the idea that nations, who do not 
feel bound to protect the elephant, will not suddenly and enthusiastically 
fight syndicated poaching throughout Africa because the species becomes 
protected by CIL.  Significantly, proclaiming custom with uncertain 
evidence diminishes the legal weight of CIL.  Scholars should look to the 
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152  See generally H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
153  Scott and Carr, supra note 49, at 75. 
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reciprocal nature of rights and obligation necessary of a legal norm when 
asserting custom.154  “The creation of customary international law is not 
momentary.  It emanates from an ‘intensive dialectical process’ between 
different actors of the international community.”155  Cutting short that 
process, by asserting CIL where it may not exist, creates the false impression 
that the problem is solved.  More elephants are illegally killed each year than 
are born,156 the elephant does not have time under the present international 
protections to wait for the legal community to discover that they were 
wrong.  
  
                                                 
154  See Weisburd, supra note 146, at 8. 
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